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MISSISSIPPI STATUTORY CLAIMS FOR FALSE ADVERTISING
E. Barney Robinson 111*
"Advertising may be described as the science of arresting the human
intelligence long enough to get money from it."1
I. INTRODUCTION
As Mississippi continues to move into the digital age of mass media and e-
commerce, the importance of advertising to business is growing. Converging
with these changes is a new emphasis on consumer protection. Consumer-relat-
ed commercial litigation has mushroomed in recent years, and businesses that
once resolved their inter-business disputes informally are now more willing to
litigate matters previously hidden from public view.
In recent times, the bar has moved headlong into commercial litigation. In the
process, many attorneys have discovered longstanding but seldom used statutory
claims. Further, the coming ubiquity of the Internet, and its creeping domination
over consumer and business commerce, is certain to breed numerous advertising
disputes-both between businesses and with consumers. For these reasons, false
or deceptive advertising is one area that will spawn increasing litigation in com-
ing years.
False advertising, as a topic, includes a broad area of the law. When taken
most broadly, it may include claims as diverse as trade and service mark infringe-
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ment as well as the common law torts of unfair competition2 and "passing off."3
One could easily fill a large book with a survey of the entire subject.'
This Article, however, focuses on two specific statutory claims regarding false
advertising under Mississippi law: claims under the Mississippi Unfair Trade
Practices Act ("MUTPA" or "Act");' and claims under the deceptive advertising
statute, Mississippi Code section 97-23-3. These statutes are of interest for three
reasons. First, the MUTPA was recently amended to provide for private causes
of action.' Second, Mississippi Code section 97-23-3 is a somewhat obscure
statute that has seldom been used. Finally, as the federal courts become more
congested due to Congress's increasing federalization of criminal law, many
practitioners are seeking non-federal civil remedies for commercial wrongs.
II. THE MISSISSIPPI UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT
"The art of publicity is a black art."7
A. Prohibited Acts
The Mississippi Unfair Trade Practices Act 8 generally prohibits "[u]nfair meth-
ods of competition affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive trade practices in
or affecting commerce . . ... - Although the Act does not purport to limit the
myriad of conceivable acts that could constitute an "[u]nfair or deceptive trade
practice[,]"1 0 it does provide a non-exhaustive list of prohibited practices. Some
of these prohibitions clearly implicate false advertising. For example, the Act
prohibits:
2. Mississippi first recognized the tort of unfair competition years ago. See, e.g., Memphis Steam
Laundry-Cleaners v. Lindsey, 192 Miss. 224, 5 So. 2d 227, 232 (1941) (recognizing tort for unfair and mali-
cious competition where dominant purpose is to inflict wrongful competitive injury).
3. Under Mississippi common law, an action may be brought for misrepresenting the origin of goods or
misappropriating a trade name. As a prerequisite to a claim for common law "passing" or "palming off," a
plaintiff must show that a word or term is inherently distinctive or has, "by usage, acquire[d] a secondary...
meaning as indicating the goods or business of a particular person, so as to entitle him to protection against any
unfair or piratical use or simulation thereof by another." Richardson v. Thomas, 257 So. 2d 877, 879 (Miss.
1972) (quoting 52 AM. JUR. TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES, ETC., § 55 (1944)). The plaintiff must thereafter show
misappropriation and consumer confusion.
4. Whenever an attorney confronts a false advertising issue, he should consider a host of potential claims,
many of which are federal. For example, the federal Lanham Act specifically prohibits false or deceptive
advertising. Specifically, 15 U.S.C. § I 125(a)(l)(B) provides, in part, that:
[a]ny person who ... in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteris-
tics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or another person's goods, services, or commercial activi-
ties, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged
by such act.
This section provides protection against a "myriad of deceptive commercial practices," including false advertis-
ing or promotion. Resource Developers, Inc. v. Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Found., 926 F.2d 134, 139 (2d
Cir. 1991).
5. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-24-I to 75-24-27 (1972 & Supp. 1999).
6. Id. at § 75-24-15.
7. Learned Hand, quoted in ROBERT I. FITZHENRY, THE FITZHENRY & WHITESIDE BOOK OF QUOTArTONS 19
(1993).
8. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-24-1 to 75-24-27 (1972 & Supp. 1999).
9. Id. at § 75-24-5(t) (Supp. 1999).
10. Id.
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(a) Passing off goods or services as those of another;
(b) Misrepresentation of the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of
goods or services;
(c) Misrepresentation of affiliation, connection, or association with, or certifi-
cation by another;
(d) Misrepresentation of designations of geographic origin in connection with
goods or services;
(e) Representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, character-
istics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have or that
a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection that
he does not have;
(f) Representing that goods are original or new if they are reconditioned,
reclaimed, used, or secondhand;
(g) Representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or
grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another;
(h) Disparaging the goods, services, or business of another by false or mis-
leading representation of fact;
(i) Advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised;
(I) Advertising goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably
expectable public demand, unless the advertisement discloses a limitation
of quantity;
(k) Misrepresentations of fact concerning the reasons for, existence of, or
amounts of price reductions."
Obviously, Mississippi Code section 75-24-5 implicates a large number of
practices that are broader in scope than mere false advertising. The statute, how-
ever, has been considered in the specific context of advertising in at least three
reported Mississippi cases.
B. Must the Advertising Be Literally False?
In Southwest Starving Artists Group, Inc. v. State ex rel. Summer, 2 the court
considered whether an advertisement had to be literally false to be actionable
under the MUTPA. Southwest Starving Artists Group ran various radio and tele-
vision advertisements promoting an art sale. 3 The advertisements and posted
notices generally followed a format stating:
11. Id. at § 75-24-5(2) (1972 & Supp. 1999).
12. 364 So. 2d 1128 (Miss. 1978).
13. Id. at 1130.
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SOUTHWEST STARVING ARTISTS
ART SALE
THIS SUNDAY ONLY
NOTHING OVER $35
(Including Beautiful Sofa Size Paintings)
MOST UNDER $20
FINE ART FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD
IDEAL FOR GIFTS
SUNDAY 12:00 5:00 PM
FREE ADMISSION
MISSISSIPPI STATE FAIRGROUNDS
AGRICULTURE BUILDING
SPONSORED BY THE SOUTHWEST STARVING
ARTIST GROUP, INC.
DEPOSIT GUARANTY BANK BLDG., NO. 1225,
JACKSON, MISS. 3920114
Nothing in the advertisements was literally false. However, at trial, the evi-
dence showed that ninety percent of the paintings offered for sale came from
Hong Kong, eight to nine percent were from areas outside of the United States,
and only one to two percent were from American artists."5 Based on this evi-
dence, the Mississippi Supreme Court adopted the Chancellor's finding that:
It was entirely possible for a reasonable person to believe after seeing and hear-
ing the advertising complained of.. . that this sale was being put on by a group
of artists who were desperate or hurting and wanted to part with their paintings
at an extremely reasonable or below reasonable price; that they were either local
as in Southwest Jackson or regional as in Southwest United States or the Texas
area, when in truth the [Southwest Starving Artists Group] is owned by one per-
son and ninety percent of the art he sells is from Hong Kong. It is also true that
the paintings carried names which indicated a different origin than from what
was otherwise portrayed by the publicity.1"
Thus, Southwest Starving Artists established that Mississippi law recognizes
the actionability of misleading advertisements even if the advertisement is not
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1131.
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literally false." The use of the words "Southwest" and "starving" was sufficient
to render the advertisements misleading as to the origin and sponsorship of the
goods for sale.
C. What is 'Advertising "for Purposes of the Statute?
The radio and television "spots" and flyers in Southwest Starving Artists clear-
ly constituted "advertising" as that phrase is commonly understood. However, on
its next occasion to address such claim, the Mississippi Supreme Court encoun-
tered a more difficult set of facts.
In Deer Creek Construction Co. v. Peterson,8 the court considered the issue of
what constitutes "advertising" for purposes of the MUTPA. Peterson alleged that
Deer Creek Construction Company ("Deer Creek") had misrepresented that it
would complete her residence within ninety days."9 The representations were
personal in nature and not part of a public advertising campaign. According to
Peterson, they nevertheless violated Mississippi Code section 75-24-5(i), which
prohibits "[a]dvertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as adver-
tised.'""
The trial court directed a verdict for Deer Creek on this count and the
Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. Specifically, the court held: "[wie are of
the opinion and so hold that the term 'advertising' used in [75-24-5(i)] was
intended to mean advertising and offering to the general public and does not
include representations made during the negotiation process for the purchase of a
particular item or items."2 Thus, one-on-one promotional representations do not
fall within the scope of the advertising portions of the Act. Interestingly,
Peterson ' holding suggests that MUTPA-covered "advertising" is a slightly more
narrow class of practices than that governed by the federal Lanham Act.
22
17. Similarly, under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must prove the following:
(I) that the defendant has made false or misleading statements as to his own product [or service] or
another's; (2) that there is actual deception or at least a tendency to deceive a substantial portion of
the intended audience; (3) that the deception is material in that it is likely to influence purchasing
decisions; (4) that the advertised goods [or services) travelled [sic] in interstate commerce; and (5)
that there is likelihood of injury to the plaintiff in terms of declining sales, loss of goodwill, etc.
Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 F3d 1379, 1383 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Ditri v. Coldwell Banker
Residential Affiliates, Inc., 954 F.2d 869, 872 (3d Cir. 1992)). "if a plaintiff proves that a challenged advertise-
ment is literally false, a court may grant relief without considering whether the ["consumer" is] actually mis-
led." United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Corp., 140 F.3d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir. 1998). However, if the ad is only mis-
leading, as a whole or by implication, consumer confusion must be proven.
18. 412 So. 2d 1169 (Miss. 1982).
19. Id. at 1172.
20. Id. at 1173 (quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-5(i)(1972 & Supp. 1999)).
21. Id.
22. Under section 43(a)(l)(B) of the Lanham Act
[I]n order for representations to constitute "commercial advertising or promotion..." they must be:
(1) commercial speech; (2) by a defendant who is in commercial competition with plaintiff; (3) for
the purpose of influencing consumers to buy defendant's goods or services .... [Further] the repre-
sentations (4) must be disseminated sufficiently to the relevant purchasing public to constitute
"advertising" or "promotion" within that industry.
Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 F3d 1379,1384 (5th Cir. 1996)(quoting and adopting Gordon & Breach
Science Publishers v. American Inst. of Physics, 859 F Supp. 1521, 1535-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)).
The required level of circulation, and the relevant "consuming" or "purchasing" public addressed by the dis-
semination of false information will vary from industry to industry. Id. at 1385. In some circumstances, "even
a single promotional presentation to an individual purchaser may be enough to trigger the protections of the
[Lanham] Act." Id. at 1386.
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This result is curious as Mississippi Code section 75-24-5(2)(a) through (h)
and (k) all potentially implicate advertising practices and yet none contain the
word "advertising." For example, Mississippi Code section 75-24-5(2)(b) pro-
hibits "[m]isrepresentation of the source, sponsorship, approval or certification
by another . -." Nothing in this prohibition addresses public dissemination, as
might be the case with traditional advertising. Thus, one can only speculate that
the homeowner in Peterson specifically plead that there was an "[a]dvertising
[of] goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised,"2 ' and the court
held her to that pleading.
D. The Limits of the Statute's Reach
Importantly, the mere fact that a practice is false "advertising" will not neces-
sarily bring it within the prohibitory scope of Mississippi Code section 75-24-5.
In Burley v. Homeowners Warranty Corp.,2  for example, the plaintiffs alleged
that certain homeowner's warranty brochures and literature violated the MUTPA
as they contained false representations regarding coverage and other matters.26
The plaintiffs, however, overlooked MUTPA's requirement that the wrongful acts
concern "[g]oods or services . ... ""
Seizing on that requirement, Federal District Judge Tom Lee held that "the pol-
icy at issue in the case at bar [was] not a 'good' or a 'service' and, accordingly,
the cited statute [was] inapplicable."2 Assuming Burley's Erie2"-based assump-
tion is correct, Mississippi Code sections 75-24-5(a) through 0) simply do not
apply to insurance, warranties and/or financial instruments. Under Burley 's
logic, these items are not "goods" or "services" and, therefore, are beyond
MUTPA's reach."
E. Scienter and Proof
The language of Mississippi Code section 75-24-5 fails to address two impor-
tant practice-related questions. The first is the level of scienter required to state
a false advertising claim under the Act. The second closely related issue con-
cerns the required standard of proof.
As discussed above, many of Mississippi Code section 75-24-5's subsections
arguably reach acts of false advertising. For example, subsection (2)(a) prohibits
23. MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5(2)(b) (1972 & Supp. 1999).
24. Id. at § 75-24-5(2)(i).
25. Burley v. Homeowners Warranty Corp., 773 F Supp. 844 (S.D. Miss. 1990).
26. Id. at 861.
27. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5(i) (1972 & Supp. 1999).
28. Burley, 773 F Supp. at 863. Although Burley found that such insurance policies or warranties do not fall
within the scope of Mississippi Code section 75-24-5, Judge Lee did not make a similar finding with respect to
Mississippi Code section 97-23-3. Id. at 861-62. Thus it appears that Mississippi Code section 97-23-3 is
broader in scope than Mississippi Code sections 75-24-5(i) and (j).
29. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
30. Arguably, even under Burley s holding, these limitations would not apply to a claim under Mississippi
Code section 75-24-5(k). This subsection, dealing with price reduction, makes no mention of "goods" or "ser-
vices." MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5(k) (1972 & Supp. 1999).
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"[p]assing off goods or services as those of another"3' and subsection (2)(k) pro-
hibits "[m]isrepresentations of fact concerning the reasons for, existence of, or
amounts of price reductions."32 However, neither of these sections specify the
level of intent to be proven before such "passing off" or "misrepresentations"
become actionable.
In contrast, Mississippi Code section 75-24-5(2)(i) prohibits "[a]dvertising
goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised"33 and subsection
(2)0) prohibits "[a]dvertising goods or services with intent not to supply reason-
ably expectable public demand ... These are the only two subsections con-
taining the word "intent."
In Deer Creek Construction Co. v. Peterson," the only decision to date
addressing the issues of scienter and standard of proof, the Mississippi Supreme
Court characterized a claim under Mississippi Code section 75-24-5(2)(i) as
"fraud within the scope of [that] section."36 Although the court ultimately
affirmed the dismissal of the claim on other grounds, it first found the claim
insufficient, stating that "[t]here was no fraud proven by clear and convincing
evidence."37
Thus, it would appear that claims under Mississippi Code sections 75-24-
5(2)(i) and (j) will be treated like claims of fraud. If this is indeed the case, a
plaintiff must show that there were intentional misrepresentations, and prove they
were made by clear and convincing evidence.38 Whether this standard will apply
with respect to claims based on Mississippi Code sections 75-24-5(2)(a) through
(h) and (k), none of which contain the word "intent," remains an open question.
F Procedural Issues Under the MUTPA
The MUTPA grants the Mississippi Attorney General authority to proceed
parens patriae9 against a violator of the Act."0 In such capacity, the Attorney
General may obtain an injunction,"' restitution,42 and/or a civil penalty for inten-
tional violations.'3 The most important provision for the majority of practition-
ers, however, is the availability of a private right of action under the Act.
Mississippi Code section 75-24-15 creates a private right of action under the
31. MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5(2)(a)(1972 & Supp. 1999).
32. Id. at § 75-24-5(2)(k).
33. Id. at § 75-24-5(2)(i) (emphasis added).
34. Id. at § 75-24-5(2)0) (emphasis added).
35. 412 So. 2d 1169 (Miss. 1982).
36. Id. at 1173.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Boling v. AI Detective & Patrol Serv., Inc., 659 So. 2d 586 (Miss. 1995).
The elements of fraud are: a representation; its falsity; its materiality; the speaker's knowledge of its
falsity or ignorance of its truth; his intent that it should be acted upon by the person and in the man-
ner reasonably contemplated; the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; his reliance on its truth; his right
to rely thereon; his consequent and proximate injury.
Id. at 590. (All of which must be proved by clear and convincing evidence).
39. Literally, "parent of the country." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 769 (6th ed. 1991).
40. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-9 (1972 & Supp. 1999).
41. Id. at § 75-24-9.
42. Id. at § 75-24-11.
43. Id. at § 75-24-19(l)(b) (Supp. 1999).
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MUTPA in favor of "[a]ny person who purchases or leases goods or services pri-
marily for personal, family or household purposes.... ,
This provision differs significantly from the federal Lanham Act in two
respects. First, the MUTPA provides that as a condition precedent to a private
action, a consumer must first make "a reasonable attempt to resolve any claim
through an informal dispute settlement program approved by the Attorney
General."' 5 Second, only consumers are granted standing to sue; businesses may
not bring private actions under the Act based on competitive harm.'
Another important procedural issue is the availability of attorneys' fee awards.
Previously, MUTPA contained a "prevailing party" attorneys' fee provision. 7
However, in the 1994 session, the Mississippi Legislature amended the Act to
only provide for such awards to a "prevailing defendant."' 8 Additionally, the
standard for awarding attorneys' fees was raised from merely being a "prevailing
party," to requiring the "prevailing defendant" to demonstrate that the action was
actually "[flrivolous or filed with the purpose of harassment or delay."9
III. MIssIssIPPI CODE SECTION 97-23-3
'Advertising is legalized lying.'"
Mississippi's general false advertising statute, Mississippi Code section 97-23-
3, has been in effect since 1942. However, it has been considered in only five
reported cases, and many questions remain unresolved regarding its interpreta-
tion and effect. The statute contains a broadly worded and lengthy prohibition
that reads:
Any person who, with intent to sell or in any way dispose of merchandise, secu-
rities, service, or anything offered by such person, directly or indirectly, to the
public for sale or distribution, or who, with intent to increase the consumption
of or demand for such merchandise, securities, service or other thing, or to
induce the public in any manner to enter into any obligation relating thereto, or
to acquire title thereto, or an interest therein, makes, publishes, disseminates,
circulates or places before the public, or causes, directly or indirectly, to be
made, published, disseminated, circulated or placed before the public within the
state, in a newspaper or other publication, or in the form of a book, notice,
handbill, poster, bill, circular, pamphlet or letter, or by a label affixed to the
44. Id. at § 75-24-15(1) (1972 & Supp. 1999).
45. Id. at § 75-25-15(2) (Supp. 1999).
46. This is the exact opposite of the provision in the Lanham Act. Under the Lanham Act's false advertising
and unfair competition provisions, only competitors and not consumers may file suit. See, e.g., Seven-Up Co.
v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 E3d 1379, 1383 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[M]ost courts that have addressed the issue agree that in
light of the procompetitive purpose language found in [section 45 of the Lantham Act], 'consumers fall outside
the range of "reasonable interests" contemplated as protected by the false advertising prong of Section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act' (quoting Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l Corp., I I F.3d 1163, 1177 (3d Cir. 1993)).
47. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15(2) (1972), amended by Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15 (Supp. 1999).
48. MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15(3) (Supp. 1999).
49. Id. See also Wilson v. William Hall Chevrolet, Inc., 871 F Supp. 279, 280 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
50. H.G. Wells, quoted in MICHAEL JACKMAN, CROWN'S BOOK OF POLInICAL QUOTATIONS 2 (1982).
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merchandise or its container, or in any other way, an advertisement of any sort
regarding merchandise, securities, service or anything so offered to the public,
which advertisement contains any assertion, representation or statement of fact
which is untrue, deceptive or misleading, including but not limited to represent-
ing himself as selling at wholesale unless he is actually selling at wholesale
those items so represented, and which such person knew, or might on reasonable
investigation have ascertained to be untrue, deceptive or misleading, shall be
punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500.00), and the
offending person, whether found guilty or not, may be held civilly responsible in
tort for damages to persons or property proximately resulting from a violation
of this section. This section shall not apply to any owner, publisher, printer,
agent or employee of a newspaper or other publication, periodical or circular, or
to any agent of the advertiser who in good faith and without knowledge of the
falsity or deceptive character thereof publishes, causes to be published, or par-
ticipates in the publication of such advertisement. Firms with the word "whole-
sale" in their corporate title are not in violation of this section so long as they
identify the sales as being made by their retail division.5
A. Requirements for a Claim
This long statute is difficult to digest in full form. However, upon closer
examination it becomes apparent that the statute imposes a six-part standard for
liability. That standard may be paraphrased as follows:
(1) the intent to sell or increase consumption of goods, service or anything
offered to the public;
(2) the causing of the distribution of advertising;
(3) which concerns something offered to the public;
(4) containing representations of fact;
(5) which are untrue, deceptive or misleading; and
(6) which proximately cause damages."2
The statute criminalizes such conduct by instituting a five hundred dollar fine
against offenders.' More importantly, however, the statute also provides that
"[w]hether found guilty or not, [the offender] may be held civilly responsible in
tort for damages to persons or property proximately resulting from a violation of
this section."'" When the Mississippi Supreme Court first addressed the statute,
the requirement of proximate cause played a central role."5
51. MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-23-3 (1972).
52. The issue of what exactly constitutes "damages" for purposes of the statute has not been addressed by
Mississippi courts. Interestingly, former Mississippi Attorney General Bill Allain suggested that the City of
Belmont, Miss., might have had a claim under the statute against a movie theater that advertised a movie as R-
rated when in fact it was X-rated. Prisoner Expenses and False Advertising of Movies, Miss. Att'y Gen. Op.
(May 12, 1980), available in 1980 WL 28510, * 1. This opinion raises two questions. First, how has the city, as
opposed to the movie patrons, been damaged by such false advertising? Second, is merely being misled as to a
movie's content a legally cognizable "damage?"
53. Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-23-3 (1972).
54. Id.
55. See Dixieland Food Stores, Inc. v. Kelly's Big Star, Inc., 391 So. 2d 633 (Miss. 1980).
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B. The Requirements of Materiality and Proximate Cause
In Dixieland Food Stores, Inc. v. Kelly ' Big Star Inc.,5' Kelly's Big Star ("Big
Star") sued Dixieland Food Stores ("Dixieland") because of an allegedly false
advertising campaign. The campaign consisted of newspaper ads, mailed circu-
lars and a five-foot poster. 7 In the ads, Dixieland listed 172 grocery items avail-
able for purchase together with the prices charged for those items by both
stores." The original version of the ads mistakenly stated in small print that a
notary public had purchased the items at issue.s In fact, the notary public had
merely accompanied and observed a Dixieland employee making the actual pur-
chases.' Despite the fact that the price comparisons were themselves truthful,"'
a Smith County jury awarded Big Star $250,000.00 in damages. 2
On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and rendered a judgment
for Dixieland, noting that:
It is not even suggested, and there was no proof submitted, that any customers
switched from Big Star to [Dixieland] because of a statement in the one ad that
[the notary public] "purchased" the compared goods. As the later advertise-
ments correctly stated, [the notary public] merely accompanied a [Dixieland]
employee who did the purchasing. Further, as stated earlier, the portion of the
advertisement concerning [the notary public's] role in the price comparison test
was an insignificant part of the ad, was placed in a small area in an inconspicu-
ous spot, and only verified that the ad was correct according to him. It is very
significant that the correctness and accuracy of the prices listed in the advertise-
ment were not challenged in the lawsuit.
Therefore.... we have reached the inescapable conclusion that [Big Star] whol-
ly failed to show any causal connection between the inaccuracy of the advertise-
ment and any damages alleged to have been sustained. It is true that the adver-
tisement published ... and circulars contained a statement which was technical-
ly untrue. However, under the facts contained in this record, there is no proof
that any customers were in any way misled or deceived by this misstatement.
6
3
56. Id.
57. Id. at 635.
58. Id. at 634.
59. Id. at 634-35.
60. Id. at 635.
61. In fact, it appeared that the price comparisons were wrong by a mere $0.205 out of a total bill of
$244.18. The supreme court noted that "[tihere [was] no testimony that indicated this minor discrepancy was
intentional, and ... may have been [an error] on the part of Big Star's own cashier." Id. at 634.
62. Id. at 633.
63. Id. at 636. In a federal case, Burley v. Homeowners Warranty Corp., 773 E Supp. 844 (S.D. Miss. 1990),
the plaintiffs contended that a homeowner's warranty brochure and literature contained statements that misled
them concerning arbitration of claims submitted under a homeowner's warranty program. Specifically, the
plaintiffs argued that they had earlier submitted their claims to arbitration because they were misled by a repre-
sentation in the brochure that if they requested arbitration, they "didn't have to accept the arbitrator's decision,
but [the] builder [would be] obligated to comply with his ruling if [they did] accept it . I..." Id. at 862. The
plaintiffs did in fact arbitrate their claims twice, and lost each time. Id. However, the defendants never brought
an action to confirm the arbitration award. Id. As a result, Federal District Judge Lee held that the plaintiffs
had not sustained any damage as a result of any alleged misrepresentation in the advertising and denied the
plaintiff's request to amend their complaint. Id.
Burley's holding effectively follows the Mississippi Supreme Court's finding in Dixieland Food. Mere false
or misleading advertising is not actionable absent proximate cause and damage. Dixieland Food Stores, Inc. v.
Kelly's Big Star, Inc., 391 So. 2d 633, 636 (Miss. 1980).
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Thus, Dixieland Food stands for two important propositions regarding
Mississippi Code section 97-23-3 claims. First, an untruth in advertising must
be material. More importantly, however, the untruthful or misleading parts of the
advertisement must be the proximate cause of actual damage.
C. Is Actual Falsehood Required?
As discussed above, the Court in Southwest Starving Artists Group, Inc. v.
State ex rel. Summer"4 held that actual falsehood was not necessary to state a
false advertising claim under the MUTPA.65 Under the MUTPA, as long as the
advertisement is misleading as a whole, it may be actionable. At least one feder-
al district court has employed the same standard with respect to false advertising
claims under Mississippi Code section 97-23-3.11
In Watson v. First Commonwealth Life Insurance Co.,67 the plaintiff asserted
various claims surrounding an advertisement for student loans. Watson claimed
the advertisement was misleading because its primary purpose was to sell life
insurance, a fact not disclosed in the ad.' The advertisement read: "Could you
use $25,000 for your child's education? GUARANTEED STUDENT LOANS
(It's NOT Too Late for Fall Semester) NO COSIGNERS NOCOLLATERAL
NORED TAPE, Also Plus Loans, CALL DAVE BARLOW, 6364613, 24 Hours
Daily, 7 Days Weekly."6
On the defendant's motion for summary judgment, Federal District Judge
Barbour dismissed Watson's fraud claim, but found that the case "[was] suffi-
cient under [Mississippi Code section] 97-23-3 only because the statute allows
recovery for advertising which is merely 'misleading' as opposed to fraudu-
lent."7 Watson thus stands for the well-established proposition that advertising
which is literally true, but misleading as a whole, is actionable under the statute.
D. Must the False or Misleading Advertising be Done Intentionally?
Deer Creek Construction Co. v. Peterson,7 appears to have adopted a fraud-
type standard for false advertising claims under Mississippi Code section 75-25-
5(2)(i). 7 However, the level of scienter necessary to state a claim under
Mississippi Code section 93-23-3 remains unclear.
The statute itself provides some indication with its use of the word "intent."
For example, it provides, in part, that:
64. 364 So. 2d 1128 (Miss. 1978).
65. Id. at 1131; see supra at section 11 B.
66. See Watson v. First Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 686 F. Supp. 153 (S.D. Miss. 1988).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 154-55.
69. Id. at 154.
70. Id. at 155; cf Sistrunk v. Cuna Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 733 F Supp. 1080, 1084 (S.D. Miss. 1989) ("Closely
related to Sistrunk's claim for fraud is his cause of action.., predicated on an alleged violation of [Mississippi
Code section] 97-23-3").
71. 412 So. 2d 1169 (Miss. 1982).
72. Id. at 1173.
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Any person who, with intent to sell . . merchandise, securities, service, or any-
thing offered by such person, . . or who, with intent to increase the consump-
tion of or demand for such merchandise, securities, service or other thing, or to
induce the public in any manner to enter into any obligation relating thereto, or
to acquire title thereto, or an interest therein, makes, publishes, disseminates,
circulates or places before the public [false or misleading advertising].73
Unfortunately, even a careful parsing of the statute yields no obvious answer as
the word "intent" appears to be tied to the intent to sell, not necessarily the intent
to mislead. Yet, this poorly drafted statute is certainly open to more than one rea-
sonable interpretation.
Although the Mississippi Supreme Court has not resolved this issue, it has
given us some indication of its position. In Dixieland Food Stores, Inc. v. Kelly's
Big Star, Inc.,' the court addressed the fact that an advertised grocery price com-
parison was incorrect by $0.205 out of a total bill of $244.18."' The Supreme
Court noted that "[tihere [was] no testimony that indicate[d] this minor discrep-
ancy was intentional, and ... may have been [an error] on the part of Big Star's
own cashier."7 ,
E. If Truthful and Not Misleading, Advertising Need Not Include
All the Details of the Advertised Transaction.
In a recent reported federal case concerning Mississippi Code section 97-23-3,
Federal District Judge Tom Lee confronted the issue of whether a homeowner's
warranty brochure violated the statute." In Burley v. Homeowners Warranty
Corp.," the plaintiffs contended that the defendant's brochures "contained mis-
leading representations as to what would constitute a 'major construction defect'
that would be covered" under the homeowner's warranty.79 Based on this con-
tention, the plaintiffs sought leave to amend their complaint to add a claim under
Mississippi Code section 97-23-3.8o
Judge Lee, in denying the plaintiffs' requested amendment, held:
Plaintiffs' real objection is not that the brochure and other documents provided
are misleading regarding the coverage that would be granted; rather, plaintiffs
are simply dissatisfied with the coverage actually provided under the contract.
That will not support the cause of action proposed to be added by amendment to
the complaint.81
73. MISS. CODE Ar. § 97-23-3 (1972) (emphasis added).
74. 391 So. 2d 633 (Miss. 1980).
75. Id. at 634.
76. Id.
77. See Burley v. Homeowners Warranty Corp., 733 F Supp. 844 (S.D. Miss. 1990).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 861.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 862.
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Implicitly, this indicates that as long as advertising is truthful and not misleading,
it need not contain all the terms of the underlying transaction.
Judge Lee's holding in Burley foreshadowed the Mississippi Supreme Court's
recent decision in Sweatt v. Murphy.82 In Sweatt, the plaintiff tenant was injured
on leased property when the porch swing on which he was sitting fell because of
a break in the hook securing the swing to the ceiling.8" Sweatt sued his landlord
for alleged violations of the Mississippi Residential Landlord and Tenant Act,8"
negligence, and breach of contract." Sweatt later sought leave from the trial
court to amend his complaint to add a false advertising claim under Mississippi
Code section 97-23-3.1 Specifically, Sweatt contended that a newspaper adver-
tisement for the leased premises was false and/or misleading with respect to the
safety and condition of the house." The ad in question merely stated: "Inviting
3 [bedroom] home. 1 [block] from beach. [Fireplace], hardwood floors, Cent[ral
heat/air], porch w[ith] swing, etc. Avail[ablel 4/1 $750/month [plus deposit].
8647903."8
As in Burley, the Sweatt trial court denied the plaintiff's request to add a false
advertising claim to his complaint.' On appeal, in affirming the lower court's
decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court held:
None of the specific defects which, Sweatt alleges, existed in the house were in
any way misrepresented in this advertisement. The advertisement merely
described, in general terms, the nature of the house, and no representations were
made in the ad regarding the electrical outlets, allegedly defective porch swing,
'malfunctioning bathroom fixtures,' nor any of the other defects alleged by
[Sweatt]. Sweatt is unable to demonstrate any false or misleading representa-
tions in the advertisement, and the trial judge correctly refused to permit Sweatt
to amend his complaint in this regard."
Based on the decisions in Burley and Sweatt, it appears that Mississippi courts
are reluctant to require that advertisements exhaustively disclose every detail of a
proposed transaction. This is a positive development, otherwise many breach of
warranty actions, bad faith actions, sales disputes, and a myriad of other actions
would be transformed into statutory false advertising claims under Mississippi
Code section 97-23-3-a result the legislature likely did not intend.
82. 733 So. 2d 207 (Miss. 1999).
83. Id. at 208.
84. Miss. CODE ANJN. §§ 89-8-1 to 89-8-27 (1972 & Supp. 1999).
85. Sweatt v. Murphy, 733 So. 2d 207, 207-12 (Miss. 1999).
86. Id. at 212.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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IV CONCLUSION
Advertising is "the lubricant for the free-enterprise system."'"
In the past, many false advertising disputes have been heard in federal court
under various federal acts. Counsel should be aware, however, that the
Mississippi Code provides two viable alternatives.
With the growth of modem media and the proliferation of e-commerce, adver-
tising is taking on an even greater role in our economy. In today's litigious soci-
ety, it is increasingly important for attorneys to advise their clients about the
laws' requirements with respect to advertising. Marketing personnel often have
one goal in mind: sales. However, a prudent business will ensure that counsel
also plays a role in advertising decisions.
91. LeoArthur Kelmenson, quoted in MICHAEL McKENNA, THE STEIN & DAY DICTIONARY OF DEFINITIVE
QUOTATIONS 11 (1983).
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